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This chapter argues that there is a collective responsibility to have enough 
children in order to ensure that people will not, in the future, suffer great harm 
due to depopulation. Moreover, if people stopped having children voluntarily, it 
could be legitimate for states to incentivize and maybe even coerce individuals 
to bear and rear children. Various arguments against the enforceability of an 
individual duty to bear and rear children are examined. Coercing people to have 
children would come at significant moral cost; however, none of the arguments 
against enforceability seem decisive. The existence of a collective responsibility 
to have children bears on the question of whether parents and non-parents 
ought to shoulder the costs of childbearing and child rearing together.
Keywords:   childbearing, child rearing, duty, children, depopulation, harm, enforceability, costs, 
parents, non-parents
Introduction
Could there ever be a duty to have children? I explore the case for a positive 
answer and advance the suggestion that there is a collective responsibility1 to 
procreate and raise (enough) children—in short “to have children”—in order to 
avoid great harm to a potential last generation of childless people. By collective 
responsibility I mean the duty owed by a group of people to individuals who are 
vulnerable to how the respective group of people act (or fail to act) collectively.2 
I also address the question whether such a responsibility can, under certain 
circumstances, translate into individual and enforceable duties. My interest is 
not in the related discussion about whether there are reasons to bring into 
existence children whose lives are very likely to be good, and about the weight 
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of these reasons. Rather, I consider the possibility that a general duty to help 
others can, under certain circumstances, entail a duty to have children in order 
to avoid dramatic depopulation and its material and psychological consequences 
on the last generations. If it exists, such a duty would be grounded in the 
interests of already existing persons rather than in the interests of the 
prospective children. Therefore, I avoid the contentious assumption that a state 
of affairs can be better even if it is not better for any person; my line of 
reasoning is compatible with a person-affecting view of ethics.
 (p.88) I consider the possibility of a collective responsibility to have children 
and the conditions under which it could generate in a pro tanto individual duty 
only given certain assumptions. First, that the prospective children will have 
adequate lives3 which are not worse, on average, than those of their parents’ 
generation.4 Second, that procreation is not, in general, morally wrong. Thus, I 
start from the background common-sensical view that having children is morally 
permissible: under normal conditions (including normal demographic and 
environmental conditions), most individuals5 have a liberty right, but no duty, to 
have children.
Even qualified, the idea that people may ever have a duty to have children is 
unpopular in secular, liberal, and cosmopolitan circles. We are used to hear from 
religious and nationalist leaders that people have a duty to procreate in order to 
accomplish the plans of a deity or in order to contribute to a strong, resourceful 
nation. Communitarians may argue that the value of particular traditions and 
ways of living can provide weighty moral reasons for members of the respective 
communities to have children. But these claims do not sit well with a liberal view 
that respects individuals’ autonomy. Societies worldwide are committed to 
individuals’ freedom to decide whether or not to have children, and how many. 
This freedom is protected by legal rights encoded in widely endorsed—if not 
always binding—international conventions.6 Not only is there no legal duty to 
have children, but philosophers discussing the matter generally believe that 
there is no such enforceable moral duty either.7 Christine Overall, for instance, 
thinks that “[P]eople’s rights to control their reproductive functions ‘militate 
against any supposed duty or obligation to reproduce in any way”8 where she 
takes “militate against’” to mean something like “rules out.” Like many others 
who hold liberal convictions about autonomy and bodily integrity, Overall thinks 
there cannot be an enforceable duty to have children because this would come 
into conflict with those convictions. Finally, there are philosophers who endorse 
a more fundamental reason against a possible duty to have children. According 
to David Benatar, it is always morally wrong to procreate—which rules out the 
possibility of a duty to have children.9
Not only is the idea of a duty to have children unpopular amongst liberals, but it 
also seems out of sync with our times. The context in which I discuss a possible 
duty to have children is that of a world facing the risk of dramatic depopulation 
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due to a lack of interest of people in having children. But, worldwide, we 
currently fear overpopulation rather than depopulation; philosophical work on 
procreation and parenting starts to reflect this fact. It is far from clear that the 
natural environment can sustain the current population growth, at least at 
existing levels of consumption.  (p.89) True, in some countries fertility has been 
declining, and birth rates are below the replacement level. But these tend to be 
countries with some of the highest consumption levels (and therefore a 
population decrease is in this case good environmental news), and undesirable 
population deficits in these countries can be avoided by means that do not 
increase the overall population of the world—such as international adoption or 
migration. Therefore it is not clear that we—especially in highly consumerist 
societies—have a liberty right to procreate, or to procreate unrestrictedly, since 
overpopulation is likely to put future generations as well as our contemporaries 
who live in geographically disadvantaged locations at the risk of great harms. If 
it is doubtful that there is a right to unrestricted procreation under current 
circumstances, what is the point of reflecting on a duty to procreate?
Third, there is a pressing egalitarian worry that thinking about a duty to have 
children—which includes procreation—neglects the interests of existing children 
in need of parenting. Even without the risk or reality of overpopulation putting 
into question the morality of procreation, the large number of existing children 
without parents is enough to make one turn one’s attention away from a possible 
duty to have children. Perhaps we should think, instead, about the duty to look 
after the children who already exist and are in need of adequate parenting—and, 
indeed, some philosophers argue that there is a duty to adopt rather than 
procreate.10
Finally, it may seem otiose to enquire into a possible duty to have children: it 
seems useless to theorize a duty to procreate and rear children, given people’s 
widespread desire to do it anyway. Why use the bigger hammer of moral reasons 
if the friendly touch of inclination can do the job alone? To sum up, liberal 
egalitarianism provides several good reasons to resist the idea that there is a 
duty to procreate.
What Difference Does a Collective Responsibility to Have Children Make?
I nevertheless raise this question because a moral requirement to have children 
will make a significant difference in how liberal egalitarians should think about 
parenthood. The motivation that drives my enquiry comes from outside the area 
of reproductive ethics, from its close neighbor, child-rearing ethics. Here, one of 
the fundamental issues is who should shoulder the significant—and ever 
mounting!—costs of child rearing11: parents alone, or parents and non-parents 
together? And, if the latter, how should the costs be split between these two 
social groups?
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 (p.90) I will not take the time to recapitulate this complex debate in detail,12 
but merely indicate the main positions within the liberal egalitarian discussion. 
Following Serena Olsaretti,13 I call the view that child-rearing costs should be 
shared by parents and non-parents “the pro-sharing view,” and the opposite view 
“the anti-sharing view.” Various liberal egalitarians argue that, in an ideally just 
world, the costs of child rearing should be borne by their parents, on two 
different grounds: First, because parents are causally and morally responsible 
for the existence of children, assuming that procreation is informed and 
intentional. (This may not be true of all or even the majority of real-world 
parents, but the discussion is set at the ideal level.) Child rearing is costly, and it 
would be unfair to impose the costs on non-parents, who have no say about 
children’s existence in the first place. Second, because having children is a 
lifestyle that some people value while others—including the voluntary non- 
parents—do not; child rearing is to be understood by analogy with expensive 
tastes, or perhaps with creating something valuable, like a beautiful painting. 
Since neither the satisfaction of expensive tastes, nor the funding of creative 
pursuits in general are required by justice, it is only fair that the costs of child 
rearing be taken by those who also enjoy the benefits of child rearing: parents.
However, it seems clear that not only parents enjoy the benefits of children’s 
existence. Some of the defenders of the pro-sharing view note that, by having 
children and raising them well, parents make an important contribution to 
future public and collective goods. In a few decades, the argument goes, today’s 
adults will have to rely on today’s children for their welfare; the sustainability of 
a pension system, which requires new workers, is the example given most 
often.14 The view that children are sources of public and collective goods entails, 
according to some defenders of the pro-sharing view, that it is unfair that 
parents alone should carry the costs of bringing up children.
The public and collective goods argument has so far failed to convince the 
proponents of the anti-sharing view.15 They note that people do not have 
children with the intention of benefiting others, nor do they see their having and 
rearing children as some kind of cooperative venture in which parents and non- 
parents engage together, but rather as a private enterprise from which non- 
parents merely happen to benefit. In arguing that there is a collective 
responsibility to have children, I intend to challenge the last type of defense of 
the anti-sharing view.
An important question, then, is how the members of a community ought to see 
the cooperative aspect of child rearing, rather than how they in fact see it. 
Suppose that non-parents should have a say about whether there will be a future 
generation although they are not willing to contribute by procreating  (p.91) or 
by doing the hands-on work necessary to raise that generation themselves. Then 
non-parents are likely to have a duty of fair play to contribute financially to the 
effort of raising an optimal number of members of that generation. If there is a 
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collective responsibility to have children in order to avoid future harm to both 
current parents and non-parents, then having children—up to the number that is 
required to meet the responsibility—is in fact a cooperative enterprise between 
parents and non-parents. In this case, it is plausible that individuals who 
volunteer to parent and thus meet the collective responsibility are owed 
financial support from those who do not want to take part directly in meeting the 
responsibility. True, parents are not likely to be motivated to parent by a desire 
to discharge a collective responsibility (and they may not see their parenting 
primarily—or at all—as an activity aimed at meeting a collective responsibility). 
Contributing to a public good is not their primary intention in raising children. 
Yet, in this context, intentions alone do not seem to make a difference. Consider 
the analogy, often used to help us think about the social nature of the burdens of 
child rearing, between going to war and having children: I may enroll in an army 
of volunteers because I want to partake in the glory of war rather than to do my 
duty in defending my people. I will not, for this reason, be expected to fund 
alone my participation in the army; rather, fairness seems to require that I be 
given the goods necessary for subsistence during service, possibly a salary, and 
medical care resulting from injuries during service. That I am motivated by an 
intention to acquire glory rather than live up to my responsibility does not take 
away from the fact that the people I defend have a duty to help defray the costs 
of my enrollment in the army.
In fact, if there is a collective responsibility to have children, the foundation of 
the anti-sharing view is shaken: in this case having children is not akin to either 
an expensive taste or to the creation of something valuable but morally 
supererogatory. Nor is the fact that procreation is intentional and informed 
relevant for the question of who should pay the costs of childbearing and child 
rearing, up to an optimal population size. Even if current parents did not want to 
have children, either they or others ought to have some of them. One way or 
another, the costs of having children should not be collectively avoided.
A Collective Responsibility?
But is there such a responsibility? Consider the following story: the inhabitants 
of a certain state have always depended on a complex system of welling for 
water; everybody has a well in their garden, and a system of  (p.92) cleaning 
the water to make it drinkable is maintained through some form of spontaneous 
social cooperation. A number of individuals voluntarily work in well digging and 
water well maintenance, support the costs of providing everyone with clean 
water and are fairly rewarded for their work. But at some point in time no new 
people are interested in working as well diggers or in water well maintenance. 
Unless collective action is taken, the reserves of clean water will start to dry out. 
Without enough people being trained and convinced to maintain the supply, 
there will be increasing shortages of clean water and, in twenty years’ time, 
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everybody will die of thirst. Suppose that some of the people who will suffer are, 
at the present moment, still children.
Do the members of this state have a collective responsibility to ensure that those 
of them who will still be around in twenty years will continue to be provided with 
clean water? And, if so, ought the state authorities adopt policies that nudge 
some individuals to work as water providers? Should nudging fail, ought the 
state to adopt more coercive policies that result in new people taking up this 
essential kind of work? More generally, do we have a collective responsibility to 
ensure that goods and services essential to the satisfaction of basic needs are 
being socially produced? And, if market mechanisms fail to result in their 
production, ought states to meet the collective responsibility through policies 
that translate it into individual, and possibly enforceable, duties?
The most promising ground for a positive answer is to point to a general duty— 
be it of justice or of beneficence—to avoid the frustration of basic needs.16 More 
specifically, if some persons are vulnerable for the satisfaction of their basic 
needs to the way in which others, taken as a group, act or fail to act, the latter 
bear collective responsibility for the first.17 People need clean water if they are 
not to die prematurely, and if they are not to suffer unnecessarily. It is plausible 
that, if nobody wanted to work towards the provision of clean water, the state 
authorities ought to either provide special incentives to some to engage in this 
kind of work, or, failing that, to find the least problematic means of coercing 
individuals to cooperate in ensuring a sufficient supply of drinkable water. (For 
simplicity, assume the option of bringing guest workers from a different country 
is unavailable.)
One tempting way to resist the idea that there is a collective responsibility to 
ensure the future production of clean water is by noting that, in the imagined 
case, it is not clear that there would be any victims and perpetrators should the 
alleged duty remain unmet. If citizens failed to organize their own future water 
supplies, they would only have themselves to blame. Moreover, if they are well 
informed, perhaps they have the authority to trade the future satisfaction of 
basic needs for present  (p.93) occupational freedom and make an informed, 
and legitimate, decision to go without water in twenty years. Yet, there are 
several reasons that support the existence of a collective responsibility in the 
case of the drying-out threat. Each of these reasons may be enough to dispel the 
objection; their conjunction makes the case stronger. First, in this imagined case 
no single individual can ensure a continuous supply of clean water for herself or 
her own family. Clean water is a type of collective good for the existence of 
which people cannot be held individually responsible. Second, some of the 
people who will suffer are now too young to make a responsible and 
authoritative decision to let their future basic need for water be frustrated. And 
third, more contentiously, it is not clear that in situations like this even adults 
have the authority to trade the satisfaction of essential future interests for the 
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sake of less important current ones; we know that people are inclined to 
discount future well-being, at very high rates if the future is sufficiently distant, 
and that in most cases this is a failure of rationality.
It is even more tempting to resist the idea that, even if a collective responsibility 
to prevent the frustration of basic needs exists, it can never translate into state 
policies that coerce (some) individuals into particular jobs. Many liberal 
egalitarians believe that individuals have a freedom-right to occupational choice, 
and that it is unjust for states to take coercive measures aimed at ensuring that 
particular jobs get done, even when these measures are necessary for reaching 
equality, or an adequate minimum, or an improvement in the situation of the 
worst-off.18 While I do not have the space to discuss this important issue here, 
let me only mention three reasons why appeal to freedom of occupational choice 
does not make the present enquiry a non-starter. First, it is unclear that freedom 
of occupational choice is consistent with an adequate liberal egalitarian theory 
of justice.19 Second, in spite of the widespread view that justice is the first virtue 
of a society, it is not implausible to think that moral considerations other than 
justice can sometimes trump requirements of justice; a duty of humanity to 
prevent extreme and generalised suffering is likely to be such a consideration. In 
fact, many states do infringe on their citizens’ freedom of occupational choice if 
this is needed to secure the avoidance of great harm, for instance in the context 
of providing health care. Over seventy countries have used compulsory service 
programs in recent times to recruit health workers for the provision of essential 
health care services in deprived areas.20 Third, and related to the previous point, 
it is not obvious that the situation under consideration—a society that is at risk 
of breaking down due to lack of basic resources—meets the conditions that some 
philosophers consider necessary in order for concerns of justice to arise in  (p. 
94) the first place. Rawls has famously, and controversially, argued that justice 
is a virtue of societies where certain conditions or “circumstances of justice” 
hold, and one of these is moderate, rather than extreme, scarcity of resources. 
But a world without drinking water, or with an economy on the brink of massive 
breakdown, looks more like one in which resources are extremely scarce and 
which therefore is not characterized the usual “circumstances of justice.” So 
states may be justified in adopting coercive policies that would be unjust under 
normal conditions, if this is what it takes to avoid a situation in which 
considerations of justice would become obsolete.
There is a close analogy, for the purpose of this chapter, between having 
children and working to create future water supplies as in the example—only 
that children make possible a larger number of public and collective goods. The 
benefits that everybody, including people who do not want to raise children, 
enjoy as a result of there being children are hard to overestimate. Some of them 
are indeed material, but not restricted to pensions, while others are not 
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material, and possibly just as important. To see this, consider what it would 
mean if everybody stopped having children.
One consequence would be immense physical suffering for many members of the 
last generation. A new generation is needed in order to avoid people dying from 
unnecessarily painful and probably premature deaths. Without a new 
generation, the economy would collapse. It is unavoidable that many people end 
their lives in a state of dependency (the old, the ill, the disabled) and if there was 
no one to care for them they would die hungry, thirsty, and without pain relief 
and other palliative care. Not only services, but also material goods would 
become extremely scarce if everybody stopped having children. A working 
pension system is a good made possible by rearing children, but a focus on 
pensions alone is too narrow. Some people—who are independently wealthy, or 
who save enough—can survive without pensions. But they cannot survive 
without a minimally working economy, and most people cannot do without some 
hands-on care during times of temporary illness. Therefore, taking a wide view 
of the economic benefits of rearing children can show that having a working 
economy itself is a cooperative venture not only between contemporaries, but 
also diachronically between generations—and hence, indirectly, between parents 
and non-parents.
More contentiously perhaps, all of us—old and young, parents and non-parents— 
depend psychologically on the existence of future people: our motivation to 
accomplish things, and probably even our zest for life, are possible because we 
take for granted the existence of future generations. We need to believe in their 
existence if all, or almost all of our activities  (p.95) are to have meaning and if 
we are to avoid a state of perpetual apathy and gloom. At least this is what 
Samuel Scheffler—drawing on others—has recently argued.21 If he is half right, 
then future generations—or rather their parents—benefit us by providing the 
background, inconspicuous, motivational conditions for life as we know it.
Even more contentiously, one may think that there is a collective responsibility 
to have sufficient children in order to ensure the continuation of political society. 
This line of reasoning can be found, in nuce, in Rawls who wrote that: “[P]olitical 
society is always regarded as a scheme of social cooperation over time 
indefinitely; the idea of a future time when its affairs are to be concluded and 
society disbanded is foreign to the conception of political society. Thus, 
reproductive labor is socially necessary labor.”22 One aspect of the undesirable 
consequence of an entire citizenry stopping to have children is impersonal: the 
disappearance of the political society, which may be as such regrettable. But 
there is also a person-affecting aspect of the disappearance of the political 
society: the last people to be alive will be deprived of the good of living in an 
institutionally organized society that can regulate and legitimize the uses of 
power.
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There is a collective responsibility to avoid all these bads. Of course, the 
responsibility is not merely to bring into existence sufficient children in order to 
make all these present and future goods possible. The responsibility goes well 
beyond a duty to procreate, to include a duty to raise a new generation of 
individuals who, at the very least, are ready to cooperate in order to prevent the 
avoidable frustration of basic needs.
Enforceability
The next question, to which I now turn, is whether a duty to have children can 
ever be enforceable. Ought state authorities to incentivize or even coerce people 
to have children, if too many people stopped doing so voluntarily? A positive 
answer is more likely than a negative one to shed some light on the sharing of 
the costs of child rearing under present circumstances. If a collective 
responsibility to have children can generate enforceable duties, it is hard to see 
how some may legitimately opt out of supporting those who discharge it on their 
behalf.23 If, by contrast, the duty is not enforceable, then perhaps people should 
be allowed to opt out just like they are granted other “rights to do wrong.”24
The claim that there is an enforceable duty to have children will confront 
immense theoretical obstacles stemming from widespread beliefs about 
autonomy and good parenting. Even if one disagrees that individuals  (p.96) 
always have a freedom-right to occupational choice, one may think that 
procreation and child rearing are kinds of activities that should never be coerced 
or even actively promoted through state policies. I shall look at those reasons I 
find most compelling in favor of this position, and suggest some tentative 
answers.
I shall consider, in turn, adults-centred and children-centred arguments against 
the idea that states may ever promote or enforce a duty to have children. The 
first set of arguments has to do with the importance of the potential parents’ 
autonomy and with their rights in their own bodies. Separate concerns will be 
discussed with respect to procreation and child rearing. The second set of 
arguments is about the potential children: would they be impermissibly used as 
means rather than ends in themselves, and would they necessarily be deprived 
of adequate parenting, if raised by people who have not chosen parenthood 
voluntarily?
Some of the reasons against enforceability are more powerful than others, and I 
am not sure they can all be satisfactorily met but, at the very least, they are not 
as compelling as usually assumed.
Adults
One objection to an enforceable duty to have children is that there cannot be a 
duty to have children because both procreation and child rearing are highly 
intimate activities. A plausible system of enforceable duties cannot regulate the 
most intimate aspects of human beings with burdening positive duties because 
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this would jeopardize autonomy. The thought here is that the most intimate 
aspects of our lives are closely connected to our moral and rational agency; thus, 
to protect our agency—including moral agency—we need a significant degree of 
freedom when deciding how to act with respect to these aspects of our lives.25 I 
will not question here the truth of this general principle, nor resist the liberal 
endorsement of the value of autonomy. I assume that the important issues are 
(1) whether an enforceable duty to have children is compatible with personal 
autonomy under any circumstances, and (2) whether values other than 
individual autonomy, such as for instance an egalitarian commitment to avoid 
the frustration of basic needs, can have sufficient weight to generate the 
enforceability of the duty under consideration even when enforcing that duty is 
inimical to autonomy.
I disentangle the two separate questions of whether, and to what extent, 
autonomy is compromised by a duty to have children. First, would the 
enforcement of a duty to procreate necessarily be a serious infringement on  (p. 
97) autonomy? And second, would the enforcement of a duty to rear children 
necessarily be a serious infringement on autonomy?
It is not uncommon to believe that people have duties to help others that involve 
the use of their body and bodily parts. We think that sometimes we owe others 
personal services and many think that people have a moral duty to donate body 
parts—most often blood. The really contentious issue is whether such duties can 
ever be enforceable. It is quite obvious that an enforceable duty to procreate 
does not sit well with respect to individual autonomy, as long as gestation is 
necessary for procreation. Pregnancy is a long-term, labor- and emotion- 
intensive experience.26 It comes with health risks—which are sometimes 
significant—and it often involves discomfort and pain. Giving birth naturally can 
also be painful, even extremely so, even if painkillers are used, and caesareans 
are a type of major surgery. And we know that women perceive forced 
pregnancy as extraordinarily intrusive. In short, coerced pregnancy is 
incompatible with respect for autonomy; moreover, the violation of autonomy in 
this case is so serious that it is difficult to see how it could be outweighted by 
other moral considerations. This means that, at most, states can legitimately 
create certain incentives for individuals to bear children—making sure they do 
not make pregnancy the only acceptable choice for any particular individual.
However, technological development may render pregnancy optional for 
procreation. If and when this happens, the most formidable autonomy-based 
argument against an enforceable duty to procreate will disappear. The use of 
people’s bodies will still be necessary for procreation, but a much more modest 
level of interference will be required. Gamete donation is not the most trivial 
medical procedure, but perhaps it will become possible to create artificial 
gametes using skin. Unlike in the case of pregnancy, it is less clear that a one-off 
requirement that individuals serve as gamete or skin donors necessarily 
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infringes on their autonomy. Or, if some autonomy infringement is involved, this 
appears to be an acceptable price to pay for making possible a new generation.
Separate from how the process of gamete donation may infringe on autonomy, 
there is the question of whether individuals own their gametes, and therefore 
nonconsensual gamete extraction amounts to theft. An enforceable duty to 
procreate is incompatible with an unqualified right to bodily self-ownership. But 
egalitarianism (with the possible exception of left-libertarian egalitarianism) 
seems to rule out an unqualified right to either personal integrity or bodily self- 
ownership. Cecile Fabre argued that a consistent egalitarian theory of justice 
should recognize that the worse-off have rights to other people’s personal 
services and bodily organs,  (p.98) if these are necessary to meet their needs.27 
(Moreover, she argued that respect for these rights is compatible with 
respecting a qualified right to personal integrity and to autonomy.)
Like childbearing, child rearing can limit parental autonomy. It is a very 
intimate, emotionally intense, labour- and time-demanding commitment. 
Because one of children’s most important needs is continuity in the relationship 
with their parents, parenting is also a particularly long-term endeavour, one 
which has no or very difficult exit options. Indeed, the combination of all these 
features led Anne Alstott to argue that (proper) parenting entails a very 
significant diminution of parents’ autonomy, one for which parents are being 
owed some compensation.28 But, of course, exactly how intensive and resource 
demanding child rearing is depends a lot on how it is socially organized. 
Parenting a particular child could be more socialised than it is currently in 
societies where nuclear families are dominant. Studies indicate that spending 
significant time in child-rearing institutions such as day care and kindergartens 
is not necessarily detrimental to children’s well-being.29 If the hands-on aspect 
of child rearing was partly socialized—by putting in place adequate child-rearing 
institutions and/or other communal ways of bringing up children—rearing a child 
would be a lot less inimical to parents’ autonomy than the current status quo in 
many Western societies. Moreover, to the extent to which child rearing takes 
place in the family it need not be the job of only one or two individuals. 
Currently, several societies are moving towards a practice of sharing child 
rearing between more than two related adults; having a larger number of 
parents—say three or four—need not be detrimental to children’s well-being, nor 
to other central values of the family such as intimacy and love.30 Child care 
could be reorganised such that it conflicts with parents’ autonomy to a much 
lesser extent than it currently does.
However, no matter to what extent we were to socially reorganize child care, the 
sacrifice in parental autonomy would be considerable, especially if children’s 
need for continuity in care is to be met. I don’t know whether this means that a 
duty to rear children can never be enforceable. Accepting this conclusion would 
also mean to accept that, should a society’s children tragically lose their parents, 
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and should the remaining adults be unwilling to parent, these adults could not 
be legitimately coerced into parenting the orphans. I find this implication 
implausible. At the very least, it seems, the orphans’ needs would generate an 
enforceable duty for the adults to organize decent child-rearing institutions and 
divide the child-rearing work between themselves in a way that ensures that 
children’s needs are met (including the need for continuity of care, if it is as 
important as developmental psychology suggests it is). In the orphans’  (p.99) 
case—as well as in the real-life case of orphaned children—it seems that states 
may and should provide incentives for adoption and, if that fails, incentives for 
low staff turnover in full-time institutional care.
To conclude this section, enforcing a duty to procreate would entail a massive 
infringement of autonomy by imposing childbearing. If, however, childbearing 
was to become obsolete, an enforceable duty to procreate would not raise major 
worries concerning the gamete donors’ autonomy. In contrast, enforcing a duty 
to rear children is likely to unavoidably entail some loss of autonomy; yet, in 
other situations—such as the orphans’ example—we are likely to judge such an 
infringement of autonomy as legitimate, if it is the only way to meet the 
children’s basic needs. If the meeting of some people’s basic needs justifies the 
infringement of autonomy in the case of the orphans, why would the meeting of 
other people’s basic needs not justify the infringement of autonomy in the case 
of imminent depopulation?
Children
A second group of worries concerns the potential children who would be born as 
a result of states encouraging, or possibly coercing, individuals to have children: 
would these children be thereby subjected to impermissible treatment?31
Before addressing these worries, let me reiterate the assumption that a duty to 
have children is explicitly constrained by adults’ ability to give the prospective 
children a good chance to lead acceptably good lives. This means that, for 
instance, in a world afflicted by natural disasters, extreme shortage of 
resources, or endless wars, we would have no duty to procreate and rear 
children in order to alleviate future suffering (and possibly no right to procreate 
for any other reason).
Even so, the creation of children with the intention to meet other people’s basic 
needs has been thought to be morally wrong, as the discussion of savior siblings 
shows. Savior siblings are children born as a result of their parents selecting, 
from several zygotes, the ones that will result in a child who can provide an 
organ or cell transplant to a sibling that is affected with a fatal disease. The 
creation of savior siblings has been criticized for treating the prospective 
children as mere means to an end. As several authors pointed out, this criticism 
is unconvincing.32 Savior siblings are not treated as mere means, if, once they 
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exist, they are also cherished for themselves, loved by their parents, and given 
the same respect and care due to all human beings.
 (p.100) There is, however, a significant difference between savior siblings and 
the prospective children discussed here—a difference which may, but need not, 
make the mere means charge more difficult to address. Savior siblings are 
raised by parents who are willing to have that particular child, not by people 
who see themselves as acting on duty, much less people who are acting under an 
enforced duty. As far as respect and being treated justly are concerned, it need 
not make a difference whether or not children are raised by people nudged or 
coerced into parenting. However, things may be different with respect to love 
and emotional attachment between parents and children. If love and attachment 
are very difficult to achieve unless parenting is freely chosen, there are two 
grounds on which one should resist the enforcement of a duty to have children. 
First, because it would lead to the existence of children who are unwanted for 
themselves, and hence more likely to be treated as mere means to an end. 
Second, because it is possible that a serious failure of emotional attachment 
between parents and children is incompatible with ensuring an adequate life for 
the child.
Therefore, a lot depends on what is parental love and under what conditions it is 
likely to develop. Do most people really need to voluntarily assume the rearing of 
a child in order to form a deep and committed emotional bond with them? Some 
may think that good parenthood must be both non-moralized (that is, not done 
out of duty) and freely chosen (that is, not done out of a promoted or enforced 
duty). In this case, the charge of using the unwanted children as mere means, 
and of letting them be harmed, is more credible.
Or, by contrast, will most people spontaneously and unavoidably bond with 
children whom they see as their responsibility to rear? The latter situation is not 
implausible: as parents look after their children, children respond emotionally to 
their parents, and for most people this may be enough to create the initial bond. 
It is likely that most children have not been brought into the world intentionally, 
at least until recently; yet, we do not tend to worry that parents who had their 
children thrust upon them by chance failed, for this reason, to love them.33
Some Tentative Conclusions
The question raised here is whether, given liberal egalitarian assumptions, 
individuals can ever have a duty to have children—that is, to procreate and rear 
children. A subsequent question is whether, in case there is such a duty, states 
can be justified in policy-making to induce individuals to satisfy the duty or even 
to coerce them to do so.
 (p.101) I assumed that there is a duty to prevent basic needs from being 
frustrated, that basic needs will be frustrated if everybody stopped having 
children, and that making possible a new generation requires collective action. 
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Since cooperation is necessary to avoid the harms of being the last people, the 
state is responsible to take action to see that harm be averted. The only way to 
bring about a new generation is to have people procreate and rear children. I 
suggested that, just like a state whose citizens are at high risk of running out of 
clean water has a duty to encourage citizens to become water-providers, a state 
whose citizens stop procreating has a duty to encourage procreation. But can 
states ever be justified in nudging or even conscripting their citizens into 
procreation and child rearing?
The reason for asking if there can be a duty to have children is that the answer 
bears on the fair way of sharing some of the costs of childbearing and child 
rearing between parents and non-parents. To provide a powerful argument in 
favor of the pro-sharing view, it is not enough to show that each generation has a 
duty to have up to a (certain number of) children; the duty should be such that 
individuals cannot claim state protection for a freedom to act against it. When 
individuals claim a right to do wrong, they claim a freedom from interference 
with doing what they have a moral duty not to do, or with not doing what they 
have a moral duty to do. Many are puzzled by the thought that people can have 
rights to do wrong and there are several ways of making sense of such rights; I 
find most plausible the understanding that there is a right to do wrong only 
when there are no legitimate ways of interfering with individuals’ failing to do 
their duty. It follows that an adequate discussion of the enforceability of a duty 
to have children would need to examine the legitimacy of particular possible pro- 
natalist policies. This is an issue I did not attempt to discuss here; instead, I 
pointed out which policies are very unlikely to be ever legitimate, such as 
coerced pregnancy. The most convincing argument against the possibility of an 
enforceable duty to have children—that forced pregnancy seriously violates 
women’s autonomy—could in theory be made obsolete by technological 
development. I have also attempted to dispel the worry that consideration of 
adult autonomy and child welfare make all pro-natalist policies in principle 
illegitimate.
The existence of a collective responsibility to have children in order to prevent 
great harm has consequences for other issues. Most immediately, it bears on the 
question of whether there is not merely a right, but also a duty to bring into the 
world “savior children” if this is necessary for the satisfaction of the basic 
medical needs on an existing individual. I started this chapter by suggesting that 
a collective duty to have children can help us think about the question of who 
should shoulder the burdens of child  (p.102) rearing. It is to that question that 
I now return. What, if any, difference does a collective responsibility to have 
enough children make to how we should decide who should pay for children? In 
the world as it currently is people volunteer to have enough—or more than 
enough—children and therefore live up to the collective responsibility without 
much incentive, let alone coercion. However, the existence of a collective 
responsibility to have enough children indicates one reason why it is inadequate 
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to model child rearing (up to an optimum population) as a form of expensive 
taste or a hobby. If volunteering to have children is more like volunteering to 
defend your community against aggression than like indulging in fine wines or 
producing beautiful sculptures in your spare time, then there is a stronger case 
that having children is a form of social cooperation. And if having children is a 
form of cooperation, then fairness requires that some of its costs be socially 
shared. The interesting question, then, is which of the costs of childbearing and 
child rearing should be socialized. A plausible suggestion is that we should 
socialize, on grounds of fairness, the morally mandatory costs of childbearing 
and child rearing, up to an optimum number of children. These are likely to 
include the costs of providing children with proper nutrition, clothing, homes, 
safety, health care, education, and non-overworked parents, but are not identical 
with the full costs of child rearing. Parents also tend to spend money for goods 
that are not necessary to ensure an adequate level of well-being to their 
children.34
However, to capture the spirit of the anti-sharing view, it is essential to note that 
rearing children represents, for most people, a benefit as well as a source of 
financial and non-financial burden, and this seems crucial for determining what 
is a fair distribution of the costs of child rearing between parents and non- 
parents. If there is no shortage of children this is precisely because parenting is 
so valuable to many people that they are keen on having children, in spite of the 
significant (non-shared part of the) cost of raising them in developed countries. 
The next questions, then, are whether and how the intrinsic valuing of parenting 
should be factored in determining what fairness demands in terms of sharing the 
costs of having children. Whatever the correct answers to these questions, it is 
highly unlikely that they will entail that parents should shoulder alone the 
morally mandatory costs of childbearing and child rearing. Remember the 
analogy with ensuring an adequate water supply; before the threat of shortage, 
people were organizing the provision of water through voluntary cooperation, 
without the intervention of the state. This is the right analogy for a situation in 
which enough people volunteer to have children.  (p.103) The task is to 
determine what is the fair amount of support, if any, that they should be socially 
given for rearing children. In the imagined story, the exact form of cooperation 
was intentionally left unspecified: perhaps it was through a free market 
exchange, perhaps it was a more communal way of organization, such as a 
services co-op. Similarly, the motivation of the workers supplying water was left 
unspecified: perhaps supplying water was, for them, a mere job, or perhaps it 
was (also) done from a sense of pride in providing an essential good to their 
community. Even if we imagine that the water was provided via market 
mechanisms, and free market exchanges should determine the level of fair 
compensation, and even if we imagine that workers were motivated by pride, 
such that they were ready to do their work without pay, it would be highly 
implausible to think that fair compensation for providing water could be less 
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than the costs of production. Indeed, a case in which some people provide an 
essential good to their community and support the costs of production 
themselves without getting any compensation looks a lot more like exploitation 
than like a fair market exchange. If such a practice was ongoing on any 
significant scale—if, say, some people voluntarily supplied clean water, 
supporting themselves the costs of production and without any financial 
compensation from their community—we would rightly suspect that the water 
suppliers are exploited. We would suspect that something in their motivational 
dispositions, or perhaps a structural aspect of their relationship with the rest of 
the citizens makes them vulnerable to an obviously unbalanced social exchange.
Similarly, assume that the fair level of financial support that non-parents owe to 
parents should be sensitive to the level of incentive that some people demand in 
order to parent, and that people in fact need very low incentives in order to 
parent: they value parenting enough to happily put in all the time, effort, and 
foreclosed opportunities without compensation. If indeed having (enough) 
children is a matter of social responsibility, then it is very implausible to think 
that fairness will demand from non-parents to share with parents less than the 
morally mandatory costs of childbearing and child rearing. It is perhaps not 
impossible to imagine that some individuals would want to have children even if 
they had to support themselves all the costs of bearing and rearing them—in 
terms of money, time and effort—without any societal help. But the most 
plausible explanation of why they would want to do this is that the desire to have 
children is so overpowering and hence unresponsive to reasonable assessment 
that it makes individuals who have it vulnerable to exploitation.35
Notes:
(1.) In this chapter I take “duty” and “responsibility” to be the same thing. I use 
the first to refer to individual duties and the second to refer to collective ones.
(2.) See Robert Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable. A Reanalysis of Our Social 
Responsibilities (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985).
(3.) I intentionally avoid the discussion of the threshold of well-being of a 
prospective person below which it is plausible that bringing that person into 
existence is impermissible. At least, the threshold is at the level where the life is 
worth living—that is, the well-being of the life offsets its badness.
(4.) And so I avoid, as well, the question of which principle of distributive justice 
should regulate relationships between successive generations—that is, whether 
parents owe their children equality or sufficiency.
(5.) Because “having children” includes, for the purposes of this chapter both 
procreation and child rearing, I assume that only those individuals who would 
make adequate child rearers have this right.
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(6.) Reproductive rights figure as a subset of human rights since the 1968 
Proclamation of Tehran, which stipulates that “Parents have a basic right to 
decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and a 
right to adequate education and information in this respect.” The same right is 
reiterated by the Cairo Programme of Action, a document adopted in 1994 
recommending that governments prioritize the respect of individuals’ 
reproductive freedoms over demographic targets.
(7.) For an exception, see Saul Smilansky, “Is There a Moral Obligation to Have 
Children?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1995), 41–53.
(8.) Christine Overall, Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2012), 76.
(9.) David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into 
Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
(10.) See Daniel Friedrich, “A Duty to Adopt?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 30, 
no. 1 (2013): 25–39; and Tina Rulli, “The Unique Value of Adoption,” in Family- 
Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges, ed. Francoise Baylis and Carolyn 
McLeod (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
(11.) Strictly speaking, the argument here bears both on the costs of child 
rearing and on the costs of childbearing. But since the former are much greater, 
and since they—rather than the costs of childbearing—are the object of a heated 
dispute concerning who should shoulder them, I often refer only to “the costs of 
child rearing.”
(12.) Good summaries can be found in Serena Olsaretti, “Children as Public 
Goods?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41, no. 3 (2013): 226–258, and Patrick 
Tomlin, “Should Kids Pay Their Own Way?” Political Studies. DOI: 
10.1111/1467-9248.12111, 2014 (forthcoming).
(13.) Olsaretti, “Children.”
(14.) The best-known proponent of this argument is Nancy Folbre; for instance, 
“Children as Public Goods,” The American Economic Review 84, no. 1 (1994): 
86–90.
(15.) Paula Casal, “Environmentalism, Procreation, and the Principle of 
Fairness,” Public Affairs Quarterly 13 (1999); Paula Casal and Andrew Williams, 
“Equality of Resources and Procreative Justice,” Dworkin and His Critics, ed. 
Justine Burley (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
 (16.) I take basic needs to be especially powerful interests. They include, 
uncontroversially, needs for clean water and other things necessary for physical 
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survival, as well as relief from physical pain. I see no reason why they would not 
also include relief from intense psychological suffering.
(17.) According to Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable.
(18.) John Rawls, for instance. See the discussion in Lucas Stanczyc, “Productive 
Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 40, no. 2 (2012): 144–164.
(19.) See Stanczyc, “Productive Justice.” For a liberal egalitarian theory of why 
states are permitted to require that citizens provide personal services and even 
body parts, see Cecile Fabre, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Justice and the Integrity 
of the Person (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
(20.) Seble Frehywot, Fitzhugh Mullan, Perry W. Payne, and Heather Ross, 
“Compulsory Service Programmes for Recruiting Health Workers in Remote and 
Rural Areas: Do They Work?” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 88, no. 5 
(2010): 364–370.
(21.) Samuel Scheffler, Death and the Afterlife, ed. Niko Kolodny (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).
(22.) John Rawls, “Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in The Law of Peoples, with 
“The Idea of Public Reason” Revisited (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 157.
(23.) At least if one accepts the principle of fair play. One of its best-known 
defenders, George Klosko, sees the principle of fair play as restricted to goods 
that “can be presumed to be necessary for an acceptable life.” In the previous 
section, I showed that children are necessary for a bearable life. See George 
Klosko, “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (1987): 247.
(24.) Liberals tend to agree that certain individual duties should not be 
enforceable; for instance, people should be free not to donate any money even if 
they have a duty of charity, and should be free to vote for parties with morally 
problematic agendas.
(25.) Williams Bernard and J. J. C. Smart, Utilitarianism: For and Against 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Seana Shiffrin, “Moral 
Autonomy and Agent-Centred Options,” Analysis 51, no. 4 (1001): 244–254.
(26.) An excellent, book-length discussion of the philosophical relevance of 
pregnancy is Amy Mullin’s Reconceiving Pregnancy and Childcare: Ethics, 
Experience, and Reproductive Labor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005).
(27.) Fabre, Whose Body.
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available by the non-identity problem: given that the children in question would 
not exist at all without the state promoting or enforcing a duty to have children, 
they cannot be said to be harmed by the enforcement of such a duty (unless 
their lives would be so bad as to be not worth living).
 (32.) See, for instance, SallySheldon and Stephen Wilkinson, “Should Selecting 
Saviour Siblings Be Banned?” Journal of Medical Ethics 30, no. 6 (2004): 533– 
537.
(33.) I am grateful to Lindsey Porter for pointing this out.
(34.) For this distinction between morally mandatory costs of child rearing and 
costs of child rearing that are not morally mandatory, see Olsaretti, “Children.”
(35.) For helpful feedback on previous drafts, I am grateful to Christine Bratu, 
Lindsey Porter, and the participants in the “Permissible Progeny” conference 
that took place at Western University in London, Ontario in July 2013. While 
writing this chapter I have benefited from a De Velling Willis Fellowship at the 
University of Sheffield. Work towards this article was also supported by the 
Swedish Research Council, grant no. 421-2013-1306.
